Sapontzis: Commentary

of that contract. For example, many parents sign
contracts with day care centers to watch over and tend
to their children. So, is it so ''natural'' to believe that,
with only marginal exceptions, only those who
subscribe to a contract containing principles of justice
are to beuefitfrom the guarantees of justice? Even
though nonhuman animals cannot be parties to a
contract, it does not follow that they could not be
intended beneficiaries of that contract. Consequently,
if the participants in the original position can be
incarnated as any of the intended beneficiaries of the
contract they devise-a contract designed to overcome
the distributive shortcomings of utilitarianism-they
could be incarnated as nonhuman animals.

Replly:
Rawls: Rejecting
Utilitarianism Bind Animals
Lilly-Marlene Russow
As is his custom, Professor Saponztis begins his
reply with a masterful reconstruction of my basic
argument, the better to pinpoint the exact nature of our
disagreement. His reconstrucltion is entirely accurate
and fulfills its function admirably. It allows us to focus
directly on the key issue: the proper interpretation of
and justification for Premise C: "Individuality, in the
morally significant sense, involves [for Rawls] having
and caring about a life-plan."
In my paper, I argued that this premise could be
justified by Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism and that
it, in turn, justified excluding most nonhuman animals
from the original position. Sapontziscontends, in
contrast, that Rawls's rejection of utilitarianism is too
weak to support Premise C. He thinks that Rawls rejects
utilitarianism primarily because it lacks a fait principle
of distribution and argues that a demand for justice and
fair distribution does not yield any conclusions about
the relevance or importance of life-plans. He concludes
that Rawls's exclusion of animals springs from his
contractarian bent rather than from his rejection of
utilitarianism. If this is correct, Rawls's position is much
less interesting and plausible:: mariy arguments (most
notably, "marginal case" sorts of arguments) discredit
generally contractarian approaches from the outset,
while critiques of utilitarianism are more likely to
demand serious and sustained attention.
Sapontzis is correct in claiming that Rawls is
concerned about utilitarianism's apparent willingness to countenance unjust distributions; however, I
think Rawls's objections go beyond that. Another,
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more basic, element in his critique attacks utilitarianism's attempt to make one characterization of "the
good" apply to all-in Rawls's tetnls, its attempt to
have a "thick" theory of the good prior to or as basic
as a theory of right. That is the element that leads
Rawls to see the ability to have and care about lifeplans as morally relevant.
The argument is too complicated to deal with
adequately here, but the basic idea is that Rawls
rejects utilitarianism in part because he thinks an
adequate moral theory must, in contrast to any sort
of teleological theory, provide an account of right
that is not dependent on a previously defined and
general concept of' the good.' Part of his justification
for this position is the assumption that different
people will inevitably make different choices and that
one cannot generalize from individual rational choice
to rational choice for society.' This leads to the idea
that the capacity to define a good of one's own, to
choose and care about that good, is morally relevant.
That, in turn, leads Rawls to his emphasis on lifeplans. The progress along this path is by no means
inevitable; my point is that we must focus on this
aspect of Rawls's argument, not his contractarianism,
to evaluate his exclusion of animals.
The same point can be put into a slightly different
context. Rawls and Tom Regan agree that an individual
subject-a moral person or a subject-of-a-life-has
moral significance, but they disagree about what
features of the subject make it morally relevant. Why
should we respect individuals as distinct subjects, each
on his/her/its own tetnls? Rawls and Regan answer this
question differently, and we need to see how Rawls
justifies his answer. I have been arguing that his answer
is tied to his rejection of utilitarianism and its theory of
the good, and his subsequent focus on the ability to
fotnlulate, choose, and care about life plans.
I would like to close on a different note. Sapontzis
asks "under what conditions can a being who benefits
from just treatment be denied the guarantees of
justice?" If the ultimate topic is nonhuman animals,
one must ask a prior question: "Can most nonhuman
animals benefit from just treatment?" That, I submit,
is an ambiguous question. Clearly, animals would
benefit if goods were distributed more equitably
("more justly" would beg tlle question against Rawls)
than they are now. It is not at all obvious that an act's
being just makes it better, otller tllings being equal,
for a nonhuman animal; in tllat sense, just treatment-
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as distinct from benevolent, generous, or sympathetic
treatment-may not be a benefit to nonhuman animals.
Notes
1 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971), pp. 25-31.

Announcement
The Culture and Animals Foundation and the
Rutgers Animal Rights Law Clinic are pleased
to announce the upcoming conference A NEW
GENERATION FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, a
national conference for college students and
teachers. The conference will take place at
the New Brunswick Campus of Rutgers
University during the weekend of July 29
through August 1, 1993.
During the conference we will explore a
diversity of issues, including establishing
coalitions with other social justice movements;
planning and undertaking acts of civil
disobedience; resolving conflicts within the
movement and beyond. Students and animal
rights scholars will present work on history,
philosophy, and other animal rights scholarship. In addition, we will focus on activism,
sharing success stories and ideas about what
student can do on their campuses.
We are seeking students who are interested in
presenting original work in the field of animal
rights, and are establishing a scholarship fund
for those who would like to participate. If you
are interested in presenting work or would
like to receive infotnlation concerning the
conference, please write:
A New Generation for Animal Rights
209 N. Graham Street
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27516
or call: (919) 942-6909
or FAX: (919) 942-3875
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